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1. Introduction 
 
Wind energy constitutes the fastest-growing segment of green energy worldwide due to abundant and 
reliable wind resources. Offshore wind, unlike its more familiar onshore counterpart, is a relatively 
new form of renewable energy that has only recently spread beyond Europe to China and a handful of 
other countries. By December 31, 2014, 258 offshore wind turbines in the German North Sea and 
Baltic Sea with a total capacity of 1,049.2 megawatts (MW), fed-in-to the grid. In the year 2014, 142 
offshore wind turbines with a cumulative capacity of 528.9 MW, were newly connected and started 
feeding into the grid. The cumulated capacity of the 285 offshore turbines installed by the end of 2014 
but not hooked up to the grid amounts to 1,303.1 MW. Another 220 foundations are currently under 
construction and further projects are in the pipeline. Such pronounced trends tend to focus our mind. 
Up to the present day, most offshore wind farms have been installed in shallow waters just off the 
coast and locations have been largely dictated by the shallowness of the sea bottom and the vicinity to 
developed electricity markets. In the future, however, new technologies will push the depth threshold 
further and there are plans for deep-water wind farms along several stretches of Germany’s coastline. 
This envisaged expansion plan apparently creates enormous technological challenges.1 In particular, 
the necessary electrical offshore grids have to be installed to overcome the subsea cable transmission 
constraints. Furthermore, various other human- and nature-related non-wind uses of the Baltic and 
North Sea basin have to be taken into account (Jongbloed et al., 2014). A comprehensive overview of 
the main economic issues associated with investments in offshore wind parks is provided by Green 
and Vasilakos (2011).   
The offshore wind construction schedule is part of Germany’s roadmap for renewable deployment 
(Energiewende), which aims to redesign Germany’s energy system within the next few decades. This 
flagship project includes ambitious conservation and efficiency goals, but above all it involves 
changing the power supply. By 2022, all nuclear power plants are to be switched off. At the behest of 
emotion, a decision to favor any energy source over nuclear was made. In addition, by 2050 about 80 
percent of electricity is to come from renewable sources, compared with 22 percent now. 
Furthermore, CO2 emissions are supposed to fall from those in 1990 by 50 percent in 2030 and 80 
percent by 2050. In principle, the Energiewende may bring opportunities for German industry to 
become a global leader in tomorrow´s energy-efficient and green technologies.2 
The original German nuclear phase-out policy, which is no longer relevant, was set in the early 2000s, 
when the Green Party was the junior partner in a coalition with the SPD under Chancellor Gerhard 
1 The deep offshore environment starts at water depths greater than 50m. For the technological challenges of 
deep-water wind farms, see http://www.ewea.org/fileadmin/files/library/publications/reports/Deep_Water.pdf. 
2 One should bear in mind that the success of a policy should not be measured in terms of the amount of 
offshore wind capacity installed, but in terms of efficient implementation. A consequence of the success of the 




                                                          
Schröder. Nuclear power plants were destined to be switched off by 2022. At the same time, the 
Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz − EEG) promised 20 years of 
guaranteed prices and priority access to the power grid for anyone who installed wind, solar or other 
renewable sources. In other words, to promote the deployment of onshore and offshore wind turbines, 
solar panels and electricity storage, investors will receive an attractive, long-term feed-in price for the 
electricity that they produce. These policies aimed at internalizing the technological externalities in 
learning technologies, such as renewables, and pursued the objective of bringing investments closer to 
the social optimum. The feed-in tariffs are often seen as a necessary lever to set renewable energy in 
motion.3  
The next energy policy U-turn occurred after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant disaster in 
March 2011 which boosted the debate on nuclear energy. In the aftermath of Japan´s nuclear disaster 
Chancellor Merkel decided that Germany would abandon nuclear power after all. The eight oldest 
nuclear power plants were switched off immediately, and the rest will be shut down by 2022. One of 
the most ambitious elements of the Energiewende is to build 6.500 MW of wind turbines off the 
North Sea and Baltic Sea coasts by 2020. There are several reasons for the rush to offshore wind 
energy. One is the opportunity to circumvent anti-onshore wind farm protests. Politically onshore 
wind farms are more controversial as people object to their size and the noise of their blades. On the 
contrary, there are few visual or environmental restraints on the size of offshore wind farms. 
Furthermore, offshore wind farms offer much higher energy yields, as the power output is 
theoretically a function of the cube of the higher and steadier offshore wind speed. However, these 
potential gains of capturing economies of scale are counterbalanced by higher investment and 
maintenance expenditures. Finally, the offshore wind technology offers prospects of renewable 
industry development, job creation and technology leadership. However, it must be said that the 
expansion of offshore wind energy has outstripped the ability to develop the necessary electricity grid 
and storage infrastructure to support it. The reason is that it has proved politically difficult to pass 
through the regulatory hoops to build transmission grid lines from the North Sea wind hotspot to the 
demand centers in southern and western Germany, not least because policymakers play to their 
particular audiences.4 
With this background in mind, we analyze the investment in a German offshore wind farm bearing in 
mind the specific German support policy framework through the prism of a real options modelling 
3 Given the characteristics of the energy system (path dependency, lock-in effects), front-loaded feed-in tariffs 
have become the mainstream way to push the large-scale deployment of renewable energy in the EU [see 
Kitzing et al. (2012)]. For the theoretical case in favor of using industrial policy to facilitate green growth, see 
Rodrik (2014). Acemoglu et al. (2014) developed an endogenous growth model in which clean and dirty 
technologies compete in production and innovation. If dirty technologies are more advanced to start with, the 
potential transition to clean technology requires subsidies.  
4 The Energiewende has turned out to be rockier than expected. The transition towards renewables has upset the 
building of new conventional gas power plants, which are much cleaner but burn more coal. As a result, the 
baseload electricity production from brown coal (lignite), the least efficient and dirtiest sort, reached its highest 
level since 1990 in the year 2013. In effect, the energy turn has so far increased anthropogenic CO2 emissions.  
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framework. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the multi-stage 
modeling framework and highlights the advancement and value added of this research with respect to 
the related literature. We successively model the investment incentives of two possible subsidy 
arrangements: (i) the EEG feed-in tariff system, and (ii) a possible future tender bidding system.5 We 
also present efficient solution methods for solving this class of models to make them really useful for 
policymaking. Section 3 provides model calibrations illustrating the theoretical modelling approaches. 
Section 4 draws conclusions and hints at future research. Finally, the Appendix offers the remaining 
proofs and further details of the numerical solution techniques for the optimal stopping problem.   
 
2. The Analytical Framework  
 
The starting point for the analysis in this paper is the literature on investment decisions under 
uncertainty, which has highlighted the effects of irreversibility in generating real options. In these 
models, the interplay between uncertainty and irreversibility leads to a range of inaction whereby 
firms prefer to “wait and see” rather than undertaking a costly investment decision with uncertain 
consequences.6 The general idea underpinning the view that offshore investment decisions are option-
rights is that renewable energy investments can be seen as analogous in nature to the purchase of a 
financial call option, in which the investor pays a premium price to obtain the right to buy an asset for 
some time at a predetermined price (exercise price) that is eventually different from the spot market 
price of the asset. In this analogy, the investor, through his/her investment decision, pays a price that 
gives him/her the right to invest, now or in the future, in return for revenues. Taking into account this 
options-based approach, the calculus of suitability cannot be performed simply by applying the net 
present value rule, but rather has to consider the following three salient characteristics of the 
investment decision: (i) there is uncertainty about future electricity price fluctuations and uncertainty 
about declining sunk costs over time and thus there is (partial) uncertainty about future payoffs; (ii) 
waiting allows investors to gather new information on uncertain future electricity prices, the yet-to-
be-proven technologies involved and the induced technological progress; and (iii) the investment 
expenditures are partially or completely irreversible.7 These characteristics are encapsulated in the 
concept of real options models. Like Boomsma et al. (2012), we assume that although the allotment of 
a license to build a wind farm is for a fixed number of years, the option to defer is perpetual. Below 
5 The stepwise procedure for developing our models makes sure that we account for regime-specific 
characteristics.  
6 Almost all the existing analyses of the EEG employ the simpler net present value rule [see, for example, Balks 
and Breloh (2014a, 2014b) and Prässler and Schaechterle (2012)]. Ignoring the interaction between uncertainty 
and irreversibility risks overlooking some important factors in offshore technology diffusion. In the remainder 
of this article, we avoid discussions of the merits and drawbacks of the real options approach and instead focus 
on how researchers and business practitioners can implement such a model if they deem it to be desirable and 
useful for strategic investment decision making in the specific offshore wind context.  
7Finance has traditionally emphasized the role of quantifiable risk. In this paper, risk, which is understood to be 
measurable, and uncertainty, which is not, are used interchangeably. 
3 
 
                                                          
we frame the investment decision in customized real options frameworks that factor the above 
characteristics into the investment decision.8  
 
2.1 The Investment Incentives of the EEG Feed-In Tariff System 
 
To start, we survey the German feed-in tariffs for offshore wind energy aimed at making offshore 
wind competitive against conventional power plants. The EEG 2012 aimed to increase the share of 
renewable energy significantly within the next decades. To this end, the EEG 2012 regulated the 
remuneration of power from regenerative energy plants in the various sectors including offshore wind 
farms. In the EEG 2012, the power that is produced is entitled to fixed above-market premium feed-in 
tariffs over longer periods, meaning that the operator receives a pre-determined fixed number of cents 
(ct) per kilowatt hour (kWh). Feed-in tariffs are differentiated by technology to outweigh technology-
specific cost disadvantages compared with conventional power generation based on coal, gas or 
nuclear fuels. They are based on the market price topped up by a premium payment. These contractual 
prices are levied on electricity bills and the cost is thus borne by German consumers. 
Offshore wind farms receive an initial remuneration of 15 ct/kWh for a period of 12 years. As an 
additional option the so-called acceleration model (“Stauchungsmodell”) was included in the EEG 
2012. With this front-loaded model, the operating company has the opportunity to receive initial 
remuneration of 19 ct/kWh for a shortened period of 8 years, provided that the wind farm is put into 
operation before 2018. In other words, the acceleration model intends to bring forward project 
revenues to earlier years. Furthermore, for projects that are at least 12 nautical miles away from the 
coast and/or in water deeper than 20 meters, the period for the increased initial remuneration is 
extended depending on the actual site conditions. Strictly speaking, the period during which the 
increased initial remuneration of 15 ct/kWh is paid is extended by 0.5 months for each nautical mile 
exceeding 12 nautical miles that the deep-water wind farm is from the coast and by 1.7 months for 
each full meter of water depth beyond 20 meters.9 This special regulation also applies to wind farms 
of which the operators voted for the higher remuneration rate of 19 ct/kWh for a period of 8 years in 
line with the acceleration model. Under these circumstances, the remuneration of 15 ct/kWh is only 
due for the extension period. Afterwards, a lower bound flat rate of 3.5 ct/kWh is guaranteed until the 
end of the subsidy period of 20 years. The market electricity prices are applied for the remaining 5 
8 The real options literature so far has not adopted such an encompassing view, but several elements have 
already been developed. Indeed, extensive literature exists on investment under uncertainty, and we naturally 
build on it. For example, Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Stokey (2009) provided textbook treatments of the real 
options workhorse models as well as illuminating taxonomies of the literature. Boomsma et al. (2012) provided 
an onshore wind power case study for Norway employing a real options framework. Another early example is 
Hlouskova et al. (2005). However, none of the papers consider the specific design of the German EEG feed-in 
support system for offshore wind energy. 
9 For the estimated impact of depth and distance from the coast upon offshore wind energy costs, see Green and 
Vasilakos (2011), Table 2, p. 498 and Prässler and Schaechterle (2012), Appendices B1 and B2. 
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years, until the offshore wind farm is completely written off. The graphical illustration in Figure 1 
clarifies the assumed timeline of the multi-stage fixed feed-in tariff scheme. 
 
Figure 1: Timeline of the Multi-Stage Offshore Wind Energy Feed-in Tariff Scheme 
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Which incentives emerge from these measures for optimizing investors? The main contribution of this 
paper is to present a tractable model of the various elements of the EEG 2012 feed-in tariff system in 
a real options framework. Modeling the German EEG 2012 support scheme entails tackling the very 
special policy design of time-limited flat feed-in tariffs in combination with a time-limited stochastic 
feed-in tariff with a guaranteed lower bound. As shown in Figure 1, the investment decision is made 
at 𝑡𝑡 = 0, while the wind farm is put into operation and the associated sunk costs are realized at 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡0. 
Period 1 lasts from 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡0  (the initial commissioning date) to 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡1 , where 𝜏𝜏1 ∈ (𝑡𝑡1, 𝑡𝑡0).  During 
period 𝜏𝜏1, the offshore wind farm is guaranteed a fixed electricity price 𝑃𝑃ℎ = 19ct/kWh. In the second 
operating phase, 𝜏𝜏2 ∈ (𝑡𝑡2, 𝑡𝑡1), the electricity price is guaranteed at 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚  = 15 ct/kWh. In the third 
operating phase, 𝜏𝜏3 ∈ (𝑡𝑡3, 𝑡𝑡2), the wind farm is guaranteed a floor price, 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓, if the electricity market 
price, 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡, falls below 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 = 3.5 ct/KWh. Accordingly, the actual received prices for the wind farm are 
equal to max�𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 ,𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡�. In other words, the operating company receives the electricity market price, 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡, 
if 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 > 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 . Conversely, for 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 ,  the operating company receives the electricity floor price, 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓. 
Summing up the above, the electricity prices received over the three operating phases are 
deterministic in periods 𝜏𝜏1 and 𝜏𝜏2 and stochastic in period 𝜏𝜏3, as shown in Figure 2. In the fourth 
operation phase 𝜏𝜏4 ∈ (𝑡𝑡3, 𝑡𝑡4) the offshore wind farm operators receive the future market prices of 




Figure 2: Electricity Prices Received in the Three Operating Phases 
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We now turn to a description of our customized continuous-time stochastic model in which the 
interplay between these various factors is formally analyzed. We assume that the wholesale electricity 
prices follow the mean-reverting stochastic process: 
 
(1)                                                           𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = κ(𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡 − 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝜎𝜎𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 
 
where 𝑃𝑃 is the nominal electricity prices, 𝑃𝑃� denotes the long-term constant prices, κ is the parameter 
related to the mean-reverting speed of electricity prices returning to long-run equilibrium 𝑃𝑃� and 𝜎𝜎 is 
the volatility parameter of the standard Wiener process 𝑊𝑊. Producer (wholesale) electricity spot and 
forward trading now takes place to a large extent on exchanges such as the European Energy 
Exchange (EEX) in Leipzig (see https://www.eex.com/de/). Therefore we assume that upon expiry of 
the fixed feed-in tariffs, production is sold on the spot market and the project fully bears the spot price 
risk. The day-ahead spot market prices for electricity fluctuate considerably. These short-term price 
changes are attributable primarily to the varying demand and increasingly to the variation in wind and 
photovoltaic power generation. Beyond the short-run volatility, increasing power generation from 
renewable energy has resulted in constant wholesale electricity prices over the last decade. Thus, the 
mean-reverting stochastic process is a suitable modeling approach.10 
The investor’s problem is to maximize the discounted value of profit for the firm, 𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸, which is 
given by 
 




10 Schwartz and Smith (2000) studied the properties of commodity spot price processes and suggested that short-
term variations in these prices are mean-reverting. Cartea and Figueroa (2005) presented a mean‐reverting 
model for the electricity spot price and derived the corresponding forward price in closed form. 
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where 𝐸𝐸0[∙] is the expectation operator based on the information available at 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡0, 𝜏𝜏 is the constant 
tax rate on profits, 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡(𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦� − 𝛿𝛿𝑦𝑦�) , 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡  is the electricity price received in various phases, 𝑦𝑦�  is the 
maximum wind farm electricity output capacity per year, 𝑎𝑎 is the capacity utilization rate, 𝛿𝛿 is the 
constant annual maintenance or operational cost rate per maximal output and 𝑟𝑟 is the discount rate. 
Pulling the deterministic parts out of the integral, equation (2) simplifies to 
 
(3)                   𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 𝐴𝐴0 + 𝐵𝐵0 + (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐸𝐸0 ���max�𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ,𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓�𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦� − 𝛿𝛿𝑦𝑦��𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡−𝑡𝑡0)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡3
𝑡𝑡2
�  






(4)        𝐴𝐴0 = (1 − 𝜏𝜏) ��𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦�  − 𝛿𝛿𝑦𝑦��𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡−𝑡𝑡0)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡1
𝑡𝑡0
= (1 − 𝜏𝜏)�𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦�  − 𝛿𝛿𝑦𝑦���1 − 𝑒𝑒−(𝑟𝑟+𝜆𝜆)(𝑡𝑡1−𝑡𝑡0)�




(5)      𝐵𝐵0 = (1 − 𝜏𝜏) � (𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦�  − 𝛿𝛿𝑦𝑦�)𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡−𝑡𝑡0)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡2
𝑡𝑡1= (1 − 𝜏𝜏)(𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦�  − 𝛿𝛿𝑦𝑦�)�𝑒𝑒−(𝑟𝑟+𝜆𝜆)(𝑡𝑡1−𝑡𝑡0) − 𝑒𝑒−(𝑟𝑟+𝜆𝜆)(𝑡𝑡2−𝑡𝑡0)�
𝑟𝑟 + 𝜆𝜆  . 
 
As shown in the Appendix, approximate analytical solutions for period 3 and period 4 can be obtained 
by numerical integration. After obtaining the intertemporal value for the whole life of the offshore 
wind farm, we need to turn our attention to the real options and real sunk costs. 
The real options are only related to the uncertain part of the intertemporal value of equation (3). Note 
that the duration 𝜏𝜏3 of the third operating phase starts from 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡2 and lasts until 𝑡𝑡3. This means that 
we need to determine the real options values at  𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡2 and then reverse compute the value of the real 
options at 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡0. The value-matching condition for the offshore wind farm at 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡0 is denoted by 




where 𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸  is denoted by equation (3). Value-matching implies that offshore investment is 
undertaken when the value of the project equals the option value, that is, when the value of waiting is 
zero. Note that due to the mean-reverting character of electricity prices with high mean-reversion 
rates, only the sunk costs’ uncertainty exerts an influence upon the real options. For details, see the 
Appendix. In other words, we assume that real options are only a function of sunk cost uncertainty:  
 (7)             𝐹𝐹(sunk cost uncertainty) = real options ≡ real options(sunk cost uncertainty). 
 
Finally, it needs to be borne in mind that offshore wind technology is still in its infancy. A recent 
study by Prognos AG and the Fichtner Group invoked the argument that costs will fall greatly if the 
infant offshore wind farm technology is deployed on a large scale. In particular, the cost of electricity 
from offshore wind farms can be reduced by about one-third until 2023.11 The main driver of the cost 
reduction is learning-by-doing technological development across the entire supply chain. Particularly 
regarding investment costs, substantial savings can be achieved. The costs for support structures and 
other components as well as for the installation will also decline. A straightforward functional form 
for such declining sunk costs due to learning by doing and experimentation is 𝐸𝐸0[𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡] = 𝐶𝐶0 +
𝐸𝐸0[𝐶𝐶1]𝑒𝑒−ℎ𝑡𝑡 , where 𝐶𝐶0  denotes the sunk cost of the sophisticated state-of-the-art technology and 
𝐸𝐸0[𝐶𝐶1]𝑒𝑒−ℎ𝑡𝑡  represents the declining variable sunk costs over time with uncertain 𝐶𝐶1  and h > 0 
determines the cost reduction over time. The implication of sunk cost uncertainty is that although it 
seems counterintuitive to delay offshore wind energy investment decisions in the light of expected 
lower subsidies in the future, it may be perfectly rational from the point of view of the investor. The 
intuition behind the surprising result is that due to the surge in aggregate offshore wind farms, the 
investment costs fall over time. This makes future investment more attractive and may offset the 
investment-depressing effect of lower subsidies in the future. One may interpret this as a “perverse” 
effect, whereby the expected technological progress undermines the effectiveness of the 
Energiewende. To address this issue, we specifically incorporate learning-by-doing effects into our 
model. 
For mathematical tractability, and without loss of generality, we assume that 𝐶𝐶1 follows a standard 
geometrical Brownian motion without trend satisfying the usual conditions. More precisely, we 
assume  
 (8)                                                                sunk cost = 𝐶𝐶0 + 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 , 
 
where 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 follows a geometrical Brownian motion with a negative trend. Thus, 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 is governed by 
 
11 Available at http://www.offshore-stiftung.de/node/76. 
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(9)                                                                𝑑𝑑𝑋𝑋 = −ℎ𝑋𝑋𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝜎𝜎𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊𝑥𝑥 , 
 
where 𝜎𝜎𝑋𝑋 is the uncertainty parameter for stochastic process 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑊𝑊𝑥𝑥 is the standard Wiener process 
for 𝑋𝑋. We assume that the stochastic process for future costs is independent of the stochastic process 
for the electricity spot prices in equation (1). According to Bellmann’s principle and Ito’s lemma, 
𝐹𝐹(𝑋𝑋) must satisfy the second-order differential equation 
 (10)                                                           𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹 = −ℎ𝑋𝑋𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋 + 12𝜎𝜎𝑋𝑋2𝑋𝑋2𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 , 
 
where 𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋 is the required rate of return of sunk cost risk. As shown in the appendix, due to the mean-
reverting character of electricity prices, uncertain future electricity prices have a negligible impact 
upon real options. Thus, we use a different discount rate, 𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋 , for the more timely sunk cost 
uncertainty. Furthermore, we employ a dynamic programming type of real options instead of the 
contingency claim one. Assuming that there is no opt-out option for the wind farm owners, the 
solution is given as 
 
(11)                                                         𝐹𝐹(𝑋𝑋) = 𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋12+ ℎ𝜎𝜎𝑋𝑋2 −��12+ ℎ𝜎𝜎𝑋𝑋2 �2+2𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋𝜎𝜎𝑋𝑋2 , 
 














2 � represents the negative root of the characteristic equation derived from 
equation (10). Substituting the analytical solutions for real options back into the value-matching 
condition, we obtain the following value-matching condition and its corresponding smooth-pasting 
condition: 
 
(12)                            𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸�𝑃𝑃|𝑃𝑃�,𝜎𝜎, 𝜅𝜅,𝑃𝑃ℎ ,𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚,𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓� =𝐶𝐶0 + 𝑋𝑋 + 𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋�12+ ℎ𝜎𝜎𝑋𝑋2−��12+ ℎ𝜎𝜎𝑋𝑋2�2+2𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋𝜎𝜎𝑋𝑋2 . 
 







Note that  𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸  denotes the total expected intertemporal payoffs of the offshore wind farm. The 



































> 0. The higher the expected payoffs from electricity prices, the lower sunk costs are 
needed to undertake the investment; hence any changes in parameters that increase the value of 




< 0. The higher the uncertainty about the sunk costs, the lower the thresholds of the sunk 




> 0. The higher the cost reduction over time, the lower the sunk costs are needed to undertake 
the investment. 
Modeling the potential benefits from learning and experimentation considerably enriches our 
modeling set-up. Finally, we can compute the aggregate sunk cost (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶�����) needed to undertake the 
offshore wind farm investment decision as  
 (15)                                                                      𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶�����= 𝐶𝐶0 + 𝑋𝑋�. 
 
We can then compare the required 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶����� implied by the model set-up with the actual aggregate sunk 
cost estimates. In the next subsection, we consider the offshore tender-bidding system. Note that, in 
this paper, we discuss the sunk costs instead of the revenue flows (“sunk benefits”). This implies that 
firms should undertake the offshore investment if 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶����� is larger than the estimated market sunk cost. 
On the contrary, if 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶����� is smaller than the estimated market sunk cost, then the offshore wind farm 
investment will be put on hold until the market sunk cost drops below 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶�����. 
 
2.2 Offshore Tender Bidding 
 
As mentioned previously, the offshore wind energy subsidy level is a debated question. The difficulty 
in setting feed-in tariffs is that if the level is too high, firms will make excessive profits. On the 
contrary, if it is too low, no deployment of offshore wind energy will take place. A solution to the 
problem would be to run a tender for new projects, requiring firms to bid for the right to develop a 
new project. Since the system is designed to reward firms offering to produce offshore wind energy at 
the lowest cost, most economists start from a parti pris in favor of the tender bidding toolkit. Provided 
that there is a reasonable number of firms submitting bids, this is an efficient way to allocate the 
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projects to the most efficient firms and thus avoid the risk of deadweight losses caused by the feed-in 
tariff system.   
In Denmark, the offshore wind tender process kicked off in 2013. The firm with the best and cheapest 
plan obtains the permit and grant to develop the wind farm. Recently, the winning tender for the wind 
farm Horns Rev 3 came from Vattenfall Vindkraft, which agreed a price of 10 ct/kWh over the next 
12 years, which is the period during which the offshore wind farm will receive subsidies. Thereafter, 
the Horns Rev 3 facility will produce electricity at the market price and will no longer receive any 
form of subsidy. The winning bid is well below 14 ct/kWh, which is the price in the Anholt Offshore 
Wind Farm. For the time being, this makes it the cheapest offshore wind farm in Europe. The 
graphical illustration in Figure 3 clarifies the assumed timeline of the tender-bidding scheme. 
 
Figure 3: Timeline of the Tender-Bidding Scheme 
 Received nominal 
electricity prices 
tZ  Payoff over 
three periods 
 1ˆt   
 
time 
 TP : fixed tender price 
 0t   
 
 2ˆt   
 




During period ?̂?𝜏1 ∈ (𝑡𝑡0, ?̂?𝑡1) , the offshore wind farm with the tender bid is guaranteed a fixed 
electricity price of 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 ct/kWh. In the second operating phase, ?̂?𝜏2 ∈ (?̂?𝑡1, ?̂?𝑡2), the offshore wind farm 
receives market electricity prices until the end of the offshore wind farm life, ?̂?𝑡2. 
With the same mean-reverting electricity prices as in equation (1), we can compute the expected 
intertemporal payoffs of the tender-bidding scheme 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇: 
 




where 𝐴𝐴0𝑇𝑇 denotes the intertemporal payoffs from the guaranteed price 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇  in phase ?̂?𝜏1: 
 
(17)            𝐴𝐴0𝑇𝑇 = (1 − 𝜏𝜏) ��𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦� − 𝛿𝛿𝑦𝑦��𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡−𝑡𝑡0)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡?̂?𝑡1
𝑡𝑡0
   = (1 − 𝜏𝜏)(𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦�  − 𝛿𝛿𝑦𝑦�)�1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟(?̂?𝑡1−𝑡𝑡0)�




The integral (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐸𝐸0 �∫ [𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦� − 𝛿𝛿𝑦𝑦�]𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡?̂?𝑡2?̂?𝑡1 � represents the expected intertemporal payoffs from 
electricity prices in phase ?̂?𝜏2, and all the other parameters are the same as in the previous section. The 
rest of the set-up of the tender-bidding scheme is the same as the one of the EEG tariff scheme. The 
integral of phase ?̂?𝜏2 can be computed numerically as in the previous section (see the Appendix for 
computation details). Once the value of 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 is obtained, we can then use the real options obtained from 
the previous section and apply them to the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions of 
equations (12) and (13) by substituting 𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸  with 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇  of equation (16). After combination and 
manipulation, we find that the sunk cost thresholds of the tender-bidding scheme 𝑋𝑋�𝑇𝑇 must satisfy 
 











The threshold 𝑋𝑋�𝑇𝑇 is found by solving equation (14). Based on this calculation, potential offshore wind 
farm investors will compare the required aggregate sunk cost 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇������� = 𝐶𝐶0 + 𝑋𝑋�𝑇𝑇 of the model to the 
actual sunk costs and reverse engineer the corresponding tender-bidding price 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 . Thereby, 
competitive prices will drive down the price of offshore wind energy. 
In the next section, we compare the German visions, as laid down in the Energiewende, with the 
model calibration results. The simulations allow us to inspect the logical soundness of the modeling 
framework and demonstrate the main insights from the methodology outlined above. 
 
3. Model Calibration and Evaluation  
 
This section focuses on the model parameterization, which serves as an input for the numerical 
analysis. We first calculate the parameters of equation (1). To estimate the parameters of the 
stochastic process for the electricity price, we use the historical spot prices from the European Energy 
Exchange (EEX) in Leipzig from 2009 to 2014. We fit the price process to the average monthly data. 
Using the maximum likelihood method yields a mean-reversion rate 𝜅𝜅 = 3.16, a risk parameter of 
𝜎𝜎 = 0.4366 and a long-run mean electricity price of 𝑃𝑃� = 3.99 ct/kWh. 
Next we provide a perspective on the various cost and price elements. The operational life of the 
investment project is assumed to be T = 25 years. The offshore wind farm in the model calculations 
has a capacity of 400 MW and the investment expenditures cost estimate is 3750 EUR/kW in 2014. 
Thus, the total construction sunk cost is 1.5 billion EUR. This includes the cost of the wind turbine, 
the cost of the electrical infrastructure and the cost of logistics and installation, as well as the 
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development and engineering costs. The grid connection costs are not included in the analysis, as the 
German regulation puts the responsibility for the grid connection on the grid operator.12 Our value-
matching conditions are computed at 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡0 , which implies that for an offshore wind farm to be 
finished in 2016-2017 with a spending decision now, the expected sunk cost should be about 1.41 - 
1.45 billion EUR. The median market sunk cost is thus 1.43 billion EUR. Without considering 
uncertainty and real options, firms should therefore invest when the aggregate sunk costs are below 
1.43 billion EUR. 
The de-commissioning costs are 175,000 EUR/mW, which yield 70 million for a wind farm with a 
capacity of 400 mW. This implies that the maximum wind farm electricity output capacity per year 𝑦𝑦� 
is equivalent to 0.035 billion EUR per year for each 𝑃𝑃  cent/kWh. 13  Another major variable 
influencing the revenue of an offshore wind farm is the real running time of a wind turbine. The 
technologically and meteorologically determined capacity utilization rate 𝑎𝑎 is assumed to be 0.45. The 
above cost assumptions describe the status quo, using state-of-the-art technology. Against the 
background of the discussion in subsection 2.1, we furthermore assume that the sunk costs will fall by 
about one-third in the next 8−9 years due to learning by doing. Therefore, we use 𝐶𝐶0 = 0.9 billion 
EUR with a cost reduction potential parameter ℎ = 0.06 and 𝜎𝜎𝑋𝑋 = 0.05. 
On the revenue side, we have 𝑃𝑃ℎ = 19 ct/kWh for phase 𝜏𝜏1, 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 = 15 ct/kWh for phase 𝜏𝜏2 and the 
floor price 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓  = 3.5 ct/kWh for phase 𝜏𝜏3, with 𝑡𝑡0 = 0, 𝑡𝑡1 = 8, 𝑡𝑡2 = 10, 𝑡𝑡3 = 20 and 𝑡𝑡4 = 25 in the 
EEG scenario. In the tender-bidding scheme, we assume 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 = 12 ct/kWh within ?̂?𝑡1 = 12 years and 
?̂?𝑡2 = 13. Remember that this parameterization is a middle-of-the-road estimate derived from recent 
Danish tender-bidding schemes. We handle the associated uncertainty by assigning different values in 
the robustness analysis. The tax rate 𝜏𝜏 on profits is assumed to be 0.2 in both regimes. Furthermore, 
an annual operational cost rate per maximal output 𝛿𝛿 = 0.05 applies. The risk-free rate 𝑟𝑟 to discount 
future profit streams is assumed to be 0.03.14 Likewise, 𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋 is assumed to be 0.10. To solve the model 
numerically, we discretize the model into equiwidth time intervals. 
It goes without saying that the model calibration leaves ample room for slippage. It is for this reason 
that we next provide a sensitivity analysis. This is intended to develop an understanding of the 
robustness of the results. To keep the exposition concise, we focus our calibration exercise on the key 
parameters. Figure 4 illustrates the numerically calculated thresholds and thus the optimal decision 
12 As mentioned previously, these costs depend upon a number of factors, including the water depth, the 
foundation technology and the distance from the coast. The cost and revenue assumptions are based on expert 
opinions. A primary data source is Balks and Breloh (2014a, 2014b). For a split of the total investment costs 
into single categories (turbine, foundation, electrical components, installation, management costs), see Prässler 
and Schaechterle (2012). 
13  The wind farm is assumed to generate 400 mW per year. The unit electricity price 𝑃𝑃  is computed by 
cent/kWh. Therefore, we have (𝑃𝑃 ×400,000× 24 × 365)/100 = 𝑃𝑃 × 35,000,000, which is equivalent to 0.035 
billion EUR per year per 𝑃𝑃 cent/kWh.  
14 Remember that the discount rate is made up out of thin air. We will not explore the impact of varying the 
discount rate because the intention is to demonstrate the effects of varying those factors that are specific to 
offshore wind power, rather than entering the debate about the “correct” discount rate. 
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strategy for varying minimum long-term sunk cost 𝐶𝐶0. This places direct emphasis on the need for 
investors, who will typically want to study the investment thresholds. The left (right) panel gives the 
results for the EEG (tender-bidding) regulatory regime. The analytical model solutions are given with 
and without real options in each case. The comparison in Figure 4 reveals the relative attractiveness of 
the offshore investment project across regulatory regimes at a glance. Moreover, a comparison of the 
dotted, dashed and solid lines indicates that adding uncertainty and option values considerably 
enriches the analysis. Conversely, one might say that neglecting such features leads to erroneous 
conclusions. 
 
Figure 4: The ASC Thresholds as a Function of 𝑪𝑪𝟎𝟎 
 
Note that the thresholds are related to the aggregate sunk costs. This means that below the thresholds, 
firms undertake the investment; above the thresholds, firms do not undertake the investment. As the 
estimated market sunk cost is 1.43 billion EUR in 2016–2017 prices (dotted line), we can see that 
both the EEG scheme and the tender scheme attract investors to undertake the off-shore wind farm 
project over time interval 𝐶𝐶0 ∈ [0.8, 1.0]. Note that the sunk cost thresholds without real options 
(dashed green line) are computed with zero real options values, which implies that the thresholds are 
just the value of 𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 or 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 by the value-matching conditions. The increasing thresholds with real 
options (solid blue line) are intuitive: a higher constant 𝐶𝐶0 implies smaller uncertain sunk costs and 
the associated decline in uncertainty encourages firms to invest earlier. Overall, the results indicate 
that the gains of early investment dominate the benefits of waiting for both regulatory regimes. 
Consequently, the optimal timing strategy is to invest immediately. The direct comparison of the two 
regulatory regimes reveals that the current German feed-in tariff system does not expose German 
project developers to price competition; thus, electricity generation is not achieved at the lowest cost. 
Put differently, a key takeaway is that the current feed-in tariffs under the EEG 2012 regime constitute 
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an inefficient means of energy policy in the context of the real options set-up. This result is consistent 
with the emerging wisdom among experts.15 
We next conduct an additional experiment in which we analyze the sensitivity of the ASC thresholds 
with respect to the real running time of the wind turbines, a. To assess the effects of adopting the real 
options approach, we again investigate the impact of various utilization rates, 𝑎𝑎 , upon the 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶����� 
thresholds for both regulatory regimes. The graphs in Figure 5 also give the traditional market sunk 
cost. 
 
Figure 5: The ASC Thresholds as a Function of the Running Time of the Wind Turbines 𝒂𝒂 
 
A higher utilization rate 𝑎𝑎 implies an increase in the values of 𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 and 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇, which is tantamount to a 
higher incentive for immediate investment. As expected, the ASC thresholds are positively sloped. In 
other words, a higher real running time of the wind turbines reduces the option value of waiting and 
thus there is a stronger incentive to invest. The results in the left panel indicate that the EEG subsidy 
scheme is so generous that firms would enter the market even with very low values of 𝑎𝑎. On the 
contrary, the right panel indicates that firms will not participate in the offshore tender bidding scheme 
with 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 = 12 ct/kWh for 12 years if 𝑎𝑎 is expected to be below 0.41. In light of the above, the German 
feed-in tariff support scheme is very attractive in terms of profitability.  
We take a step further and analyze the sensitivity of the numerical results with respect to varying 
degrees of learning by doing, h. A higher speed of learning by doing implies that the real options are 
increasing. As both panel in Figure 5 indicate, firms wait longer and only invest at lower aggregate 
sunk costs. The right panels indicates that firms in the tender-bidding scenario are indifferent to 
bidding if parameter ℎ is around 8 percent. 
 
  
15 This is consistent with the KPMG (2010) survey results. KPMG asked market participants to rank European 
offshore wind markets in relation to the expected returns. The answer was that the UK offers the best conditions, 
followed by Germany. 
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Figure 6: The ASC Thresholds as a Function of the Learning-by-Doing Parameter 𝒉𝒉  
 
 






Subsequent to this, we study the effects of price (𝜎𝜎) vs sunk cost uncertainty (𝜎𝜎𝑋𝑋). The results are 
displayed in the three-dimensional graphs in Figure 7. As expected, there is electricity price 
uncertainty in the distant future and thus 𝜎𝜎 has no impact upon the aggregate sunk cost thresholds. 
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The mechanism behind the result is simple. The reason is  the mean-reverting dynamics of electricity 
prices. On the contrary, 𝜎𝜎𝑋𝑋 increases the ASC thresholds throughout and thus leads to an increase in 
cautiousness. To summarize, the two subsidy regimes yield remarkably similar policy results. In any 
case, the thresholds are all greater than the market sunk cost of 1.43 billion and thus firms have an 
incentive to invest immediately in both regimes.  
Finally, we take a step further and highlight the role played by the guaranteed feed-in prices 𝑃𝑃ℎ and 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚  in the EEG system and the offered price 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇  in the tender-bidding system in the investment 
decision. In Figure 8, we finally simulate the effect of lower electricity prices 𝑃𝑃ℎ , 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚  and 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 , 
respectively. To simplify the discussion, we assume that the fixed feed-in tariff prices 𝑃𝑃ℎ and 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 are 
reduced in step. The answer to the question of how declining guaranteed prices affect investment in 
offshore wind seems to be “it depends.” The numerical results indicate that a concurrent decline of 𝑃𝑃ℎ 
and 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚 by more than 34 percent (to less than 66 percent of their guaranteed current level) will lead 
firms to refrain from participating in the offshore wind farm project. In the tender-bidding scheme, a 
much smaller decline to 90 percent of the current price level (𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 = 10.8 ct/kWh instead of  𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 = 12 
ct/kWh) will already lead firms to adopt a wait-and-see strategy.  
 
Figure 8 The ASC Thresholds of Declining Prices 𝑷𝑷𝒉𝒉, 𝑷𝑷𝒎𝒎 and 𝑷𝑷𝑻𝑻 (in %) 
 
 
The quintessence is that the existing feed-in tariffs are an inefficient and expensive policy mechanism 
for promoting offshore wind energy. It is evident that policymakers have to address the balancing act 
by reconciling as far as possible two opposing demands: the need to provide sufficient support to 
realize future offshore wind projects whilst at the same time sending a clear signal to the offshore 
wind industry that costs must fall. Against this background, the numerical results reveal that the lavish 
long-term EEG subsidies set prices that provide higher returns than needed to secure investment. In 
other words, the current subsidy system is no coherent solution. For this reason it is clear that the 
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current subsidy level should expire. This implies that for Germany the policy question is how to 
unwind from a period of too-generous feed-in tariffs for offshore wind energy.16  
In conclusion, the strength of the numerical exercises is to provide a perspective on how parameters 
change the competitive landscape. Furthermore, the comparison of the feed-in tariff system and the 
tender-bidding system deepens our understanding of how alternative support schemes determine the 
financial attractiveness of offshore wind power development and thereby the European offshore wind 
power market landscape under the European Energy Directive. 
 
4. Conclusion and Future Directions 
 
Given the ambitious renewable energy targets, offshore wind commands widespread support and is in 
a strong political position despite its alleged expensiveness for consumers. Against this background, 
this paper strived to contribute theoretically sound perspectives to the offshore wind discussion. We 
examined the issue in the following sequence. In the first part, we developed a real options modeling 
framework. An extensive calibration exercise then followed.17  
In the interest of brevity, we focused our analysis on two alternative subsidy schemes. The key tool 
for this assessment was a real options modeling framework. We believe that real options models 
provide a rigorous modeling framework in which to examine investment incentives under uncertainty 
and help energy firms to manage investment risk better. We scrutinized the incentives of the current 
EEG feed-in regulation for investing in offshore wind farms as well as an alternative tender-bidding 
scheme. The stochastic modeling set-up presented above tells the story in a logically coherent way 
and is able to provide the numerical solutions to the story. Although the real options framework is far 
from being the deus ex-machina, the modeling approach provides several new insights into the impact 
of the EEG 2012 feed-in tariffs on offshore wind farm investments in Germany and guides our 
thinking about appropriate policy design. In terms of policy implications, two points can be made. 
First, a shift from interventionist policy measures towards more market-based instruments is a 
particular priority. Second, the renewable offshore wind sector should be subject to competition and 
the guaranteed prices should be phased out. 
It is fair to acknowledge that the results of this real options proof-of-concept study hinge on a number 
of modelling assumptions that impose caveats and point to potential future improvements. In this 
context it should be noted that we have neglected policy uncertainty. In the first two sections, the two 
subsidy scenarios were treated as independent from one another. On closer inspection, however, it is 
16 The nuanced conclusion on the impact of the EEG 2012 feed-in tariff system that we obtain in this paper 
contrasts sharply with the almost universal belief that the incorporated subsidy level is necessary to trigger 
investment in offshore energy. The good news is that the high EEG subsidy level is largely an artificial problem. 
The bad news is that that does not make it a solvable one. Redressing the existing subsidies is among the most 
politically fraught of policy issues since those exposed to competition will organize themselves in opposition. 
17 The modeling set-up is quite flexible; therefore, it is readily conducive to incorporating alternative price and 
cost processes or even further uncertainties. 
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clear that they are intertwined and smart models should not treat them in isolation. Recognizing that at 
the time of making investment decisions agents may have information about future policy changes to 
occur with non-zero likelihood, it is realistic to assume that these regime changes which may or may 
not materialize in the end, influence the current investment behavior of agents. Therefore, the crucial 
next modeling step is to augment the current EEG feed-in tariff system with future policy uncertainty. 
Projecting the future by merely extending the past is rarely adequate, especially when the underlying 
policies are expected to be turned upside down. Rather, current investment decisions depend on the 
likelihood of anticipated policy changes. On the one hand, the extension of EEG 2012 that already 
occurred in the year 2014 provides an argument for another possible extension in the future. On the 
other hand, the most recent revision of the EEG already envisages a longer-term transformation away 
from feed-in tariffs and towards tender schemes on some indefinite future date. However, these 
schemes still have to be drafted, meaning that everything is still up in the air. Anticipated discreet 
changes in the market design can be accounted for with a just once jump/drop Poisson distribution 
modeling approach in which a policy change in the future is anticipated to occur but the timing is 
uncertain. Different pathways that German policy makers might choose to adopt, may be represented 
by different jump probabilities and jump sizes. This approach provides a compact presentation of 
future policy uncertainty and points to potentially fruitful future research. 
Our partial-equilibrium modeling set-up also does not address issues related to competitive 
interactions in the offshore wind industry. In a competitive industry firms have an incentive to act 
quickly to gain strategic advantages over their competitors. Based on a duopolistic real options game, 
several studies have demonstrated how competitive dynamics affect the timing of new technology 
adoption.18 
In conclusion, the presented model and the thorough numerical exercises contribute to the literature 
by deepening our understanding of the impact of various offshore wind support schemes. These 






18 See, for example, Huisman and Kort (2003, 2004). Leahy (1993) showed that the assumption of myopic firms 
that ignore the impact of other firms’ actions results in the same critical boundaries that trigger investment as a 
model in which firms correctly anticipate the strategies of other firms. Grenadier (2002) recently extended 
Leahy’s (1993) “Principle of Optimality of Myopic Behavior” to the apparently more complex case of dynamic 
oligopoly under uncertainty. Therefore, we ignored the behavioral assumptions regarding market rivalry. 
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Appendix: Computing the Particular Integrals for the Floor Price in the Operation Phases 𝝉𝝉𝟑𝟑 
and 𝝉𝝉𝟒𝟒 
 
Using = 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑃𝑃
𝑃𝑃�
 , equation (1) in the main text can be rewritten as 
 
(A1)                    𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = −κ𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝜎𝜎𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊, 
 
where the new mean is normalized to ln(1) = 0. Thus, the substitution leaves us with the well-known 
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. An analogous derivation for 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 = max(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡,𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓) in the third wind farm 
operation phase yields 
 
(A2)                  𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 = �𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ,   𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 > 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 ,  𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 . 
 
Taking logs on both sides of (A2) and normalizing 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 leaves us with 
 
(A3)        𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃�




, 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃� ≤ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃�  . 
 
We need to transform (A3) in terms of 𝑑𝑑 = 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑃𝑃
𝑃𝑃�
.  Substituting 𝑑𝑑 = 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑃𝑃
𝑃𝑃�
 into (A3) yields 
 
(A4)          𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃�




, 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃� . 
 
The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process of equation (A1) for 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 is well known to have the probability density 
function 
 
(A5)       𝑓𝑓(𝑧𝑧, 𝑠𝑠) = � 𝜅𝜅𝜋𝜋𝜎𝜎2(1−𝑒𝑒−2𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅) 𝑒𝑒− 𝜅𝜅𝜎𝜎2��𝑧𝑧−𝑧𝑧0𝑒𝑒−𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅�21−𝑒𝑒−2𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅 � . 
 
It is evident that the term 𝑧𝑧0𝑒𝑒−𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅 of equation (A5) implies that the current value of 𝑧𝑧 and hence the 
electricity price 𝑃𝑃  has near zero impacts on the pdf for large κ  and 𝑠𝑠 . For example, using 𝑠𝑠 =10 and 𝜅𝜅 = 3.16  from the main text, we have 𝑧𝑧0𝑒𝑒−𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅 = 𝑧𝑧0𝑒𝑒−3.16×10 = 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃� × 1.910−014 ≅ 0 . In 
other words, the current electricity prices 𝑃𝑃 has no long-run impacts on the values of  𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 and  𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 of 
the tender-bidding scheme. For this reason, it was considered appropriate to assume that the electricity 
price 𝑃𝑃 should have no impact on real options. Through some rearrangement and manipulation, the 
expectation of 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡
 can be computed as 
 
(A6)                              𝐸𝐸 �𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃�











+ � 𝑑𝑑� 𝜅𝜅






which can be solved numerically. Solving for 𝐸𝐸[𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡] yields 
 
(A7)                         𝐸𝐸[𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡] ≅ 𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃� �. 
 
Equation (A7) is somewhat informal. Note that this is an approximate solution as the exponential 
terms are on expected values, not directly on the stochastic process. Substituting equation (A7) into 
the term   




of equation (3) in the text finally allows us to obtain the intertemporal values for phase 𝜏𝜏3 
numerically.  
To compute the expected values of 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 = 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃�  in phase 𝜏𝜏4, we can just take the expected value from 
(A5) and directly integrate from 𝑑𝑑 = −∞ to 𝑑𝑑 = ∞. This yields 
 (A8)                                𝐸𝐸 �𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃�
� = � 𝑑𝑑� 𝜅𝜅




Using the equation   
 (A9)                                                               𝐸𝐸[𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡] ≅ 𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃� �. 
 
 
finally permits us to compute the term 




for the expected payoffs for phase 𝜏𝜏4. 
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